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Abstract 
 This paper explores the interlocking – but sometimes contradictory - efforts of NGOs 
and the state to safeguard the rights of those who have no land.  "The landless" in South 
Africa, categorised along with "the poor and the dispossessed" by those who advocate their 
cause in the NGO sector, have come to occupy a contested position.  As government policy 
has come increasingly to favour those who are structurally counterposed to “the landless” - 
the better-off who are potential commercial farmers - so NGO efforts have been directed, 
correspondingly, to safeguard the interests of this apparently large, but bewilderingly 
heterogenous, category.  
 While those in this sector are agreed on the importance of helping "the landless, the 
poor and the dispossessed" by providing them with access to protected land rights, there has 
been disagreement over where the members of this category are to be found, and how their 
security can be best safeguarded. Countering the position that this is best achieved through 
"tenure reform" in the former homelands, some argue, for example, that those most in need of 
security are the labourers on white farms, whose residence rights are tied to their 
employment and for whom dismissal would mean instant homelessness. Recent "land 
invasions", such as the one at Bredell near Johannesburg, are also incorporated into the 
discursive universe of "landlessness" although their protagonists appear to belong to a 
further category: urban-based squatters seeking access to land without the payment of rent or 
services. This paper highlights the complex interlocking rhetorics emanating from, and 
protecting the rights of, these different constituencies, as they converged at the recent 
"Landlessness equals Racism" conference which was held alongside last year’s UN 
conference on Racism.   
 
Introduction 
  To investigate the plight of the “landless” implies an understanding of how 
the “landed” maintain their position (and hence of how the “landless” might 
eventually come to alter theirs).  Although the difference between these two opposed 
statuses vis-à-vis land may seem obvious, the realities are far more complex.  And if, 
as is the case in many African contexts, being “landed” encompasses a wide variety 
of actual social positions, being “landless” implies an even wider divergence.  In 
particular settings, such as that of former colonies characterised by sharp inequalities 
of wealth and property, it may be that securing land for a formerly dispossessed 
group automatically poses a threat to those who formerly held the monopoly on it.  
This has certainly been the case in Zimbabwe, whose daily drama of possession and 
dispossession has been played out on the media.  Whatever the complex realities of 
the situation, the story as witnessed by the world has pitted those who formerly 
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imagined their property rights to have been secure against those who were formerly 
property-less.   
  Not all formerly colonial settings in Africa have been the site of such a 
violent transformation from “landless” to “landed”, however.  In South Africa - 
where the “agrarian situation” and hence its attempted transformation have been 
described as “extreme and exceptional” (Bernstein 1996) - the existence of a 
constitutional state underpinned by the rule of law has been an important factor in 
mediating between the landless and the landed during the years of transition.  
Particularly important in establishing and regulating land access – like access to 
many other resources in the new South Africa - has been the language of rights 
(Wilson 2000).  It is “rights” which have been seen as crucial in allowing the 
landless to overcome their plight by allowing them to reside on and use land which 
they do not necessarily own.  At the same time, “rights” have to an extent secured the 
existing property regime, thus protecting – so far – against unbridled land invasions 
of the kind seen in Zimbabwe.   
  But the South African state does not enjoy a monopoly on designing 
constitutions, deploying the language of rights, or planning the future of the land, any 
more than it monopolizes the other functions thought of as being the preserve of 
states.  Rather, it is in the course of contestations between the state and society, and 
also within the ranks of society, that ideas about how to secure the rights of the 
landless have been hammered out. This paper deals in particular with relationships 
between the state and those who have been active in the NGO sector.  Although this 
sector is often thought of as co-terminous with “civil society”, it has in South Africa 
been arguably more “political” than “civil” in nature.  As well as playing a key role 
in the design of the constitution and – closely linked - of the land reform program as 
will be described below, it also acted as an effective training-ground for the civil 
service of the “new” South Africa, performed a range of state-type welfare functions 
prior to 1994, and has resumed such functions under the present dispensation.  
  Such contestations about rights have served both to blur the boundaries 
between state and the NGO sector, and to sharpen certain lines of definition within 
that sector, creating new kinds of conflict within it as certain actors align themselves 
with national policy while others contest it. Disputes have occurred at national and 
regional levels, and have also had repercussions in the international arena where 
Third World social movements attempt to bypass the influence and impact of the 
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nation state altogether (Fisher 1997:440-1).  Although the law and ideas about the 
rule of law have played a key role in these disputes, they have been more than dry 
legal quibbles over technicalities.  At issue have been key questions about the nature 
of public morality, the division between the public and the private, the entitlements 
and obligations of citizenship, and who has responsibility for the welfare of the poor.  
All these weighty civic debates have centred on the possession – or the lack - of 
“land”. 
 
Landlessness as social movement 
  The sheer scale of what is considered to be the ranks of “the landless” could 
be seen at a workshop, held in Durban in August 2001 alongside the UN Conference 
on Racism.  The workshop, entitled Landlessness = Racism, was organised by the 
National Land Committee (NLC) as part of its attempt to foster the landless people’s 
social movement, whose absence in South Africa so far has both puzzled activists 
and been lamented by them.  
 The new intention of land rights advocates, as embodied at the workshop in 
question, was to give strength to this particular movement by linking its own 
narratives of dispossession to the solutions taken up by similarly deprived – but more 
resolutely activist – movements elsewhere. Encamped around the perimeters of a 
rugby field, a series of large marquees gave overnight shelter to scores of people 
from a range of different land-claiming groups who had arrived in coach-loads from 
every corner of South Africa.  During the two days of the workshop, they sat 
listening to testimonies from those of their number who had been charged with the 
task of representing the plight of their fellows.  Between speeches, they were 
enjoined by NLC organisers to reply in unison to new modifications of the familiar 
“struggle” call-and-response calls.  In reply to the call “Amandla” (power), instead of 
the old “awethu” (to the people) they were encouraged to reply “intifada”, thus 
identifying their cause with that of the landless Palestinians.  In similar vein, “phanzi 
Israel phanzi” called for the downfall of the Palestinians’ oppressors rather than of 
some more local, and familiar, adversary.  
 There were those in the movement who commented later that the effect of 
this globalisation of the plight of South Africa’s landless had been to turn it into a 
kind of circus: the presence of Palestinians, Guatemalans and Native American 
elders had diffused the urgency of South African landless people’s specific 
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grievances, and prevented these from being seriously reported in the press.1 But the 
intention was clearly that these grievances be ennobled, and that those holding them 
be brought together, by linking them to trans-national ones of a similar type. Despite 
the unifying intentions, however, it is undeniably the case that the “landless people” 
in this social movement encompass an extraordinary variety, and that it may be this 
variety that has inhibited the movement’s effectiveness so far. 
 My earlier discussions with activists in the NLC had revealed just how 
important the encouragement of this movement was as a new focus for their 
activism.  In retrospect, they saw as flawed their earlier attempts to foster similar 
alliances, since these had been led, or high-jacked, by elites, rather than being truly 
owned by the poor whom these activists felt to be the proper constituents of a 
landless movement.2  Yet several of the land-claiming stalwarts who, in emotive and 
evocative terms, addressed the workshop about their frustration with government 
delays, were indeed – at least in relative terms – members of an elite. The headmaster 
from Louis Trichardt, for example, has an urban residence and secure employment 
and is a member of what has been termed the “African middle class”.  His 
“landlessness”, although pressingly urgent in his eyes, was a matter of sentiment 
more than one of immediate survival.  Having stemmed from apartheid-era black 
spot removals, the loss of his community’s land, like that of many similar groups, 
would have to – and ultimately might - be ameliorated by the state’s eventual 
restitution of title to those from whom it had been taken by apartheid’s ideologues.   
 In contrast, the kind of people at whose “landlessness” the NLC was 
attempting presently to target its efforts were those who had never before held formal 
rights to property.  Even within this more narrowly-defined group, there was a sense 
of considerable ambiguity about the precise social attributes of the “landless”. One 
speaker evoked the plight of African farmworkers on white farms, for whom the 
insecurity of being evicted from one’s home at the end of a working life was a 
guarantee of a destitute and impoverished old age:  
 
We want bread.  We cry this again and again, but nothing happens.  The government takes no notice. 
Our farmworkers are still being chased away.  You work until you are 60 years old, then you must go. 
Government people must go to these white farmers, dressed in ragged clothes, to look for work.  Then 
they will know how we feel.3  
 
 The threatened eviction of farm workers, however, has been notoriously 
invisible to those in government since around the time of the inauguration of Thabo 
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Mbeki and the installation of his new cabinet in 1999.  Rather, what had raised the 
profile of “landlessness” in the month immediately prior to this workshop, with 
resonances still ringing in many of the speeches, was the land invasions which had 
just occurred – and been summarily dealt with by the state - at Bredell on the 
outskirts of Johannesburg.  Newspaper reports on the invasion had drawn parallels 
with Zimbabwe, and had highlighted the determination of the ANC government not 
to tolerate such illegal actions.  The incident had also prompted a fierce debate 
amongst the provincial affiliates of the NLC during the weeks leading up to the 
workshop, with some pledging moral support and advice to invaders while others 
stressed the need to retain a close relationship to the state and hence to condemn all 
illegal actions. 
 That the “invasion” motif was close to the heart of “landless” people was 
obvious from several of the addresses at the workshop and from the crowd’s 
response.  But the resonance of this motif, like that of “landlessness”, disguised 
considerable disparities in social background amongst those it yoked together. 
Although it was the Bredell invasion that had highlighted the urgency of the “land” 
problem, none of its protagonists was in fact present to address the workshop. Those 
speakers present who had illegally occupied land - and were vociferously alerting 
others to the necessity of doing so themselves if the government failed to give it back 
- were mostly those who had filed claims to have their former, confiscated, properties 
returned, and hence belonged to those, like the headmaster, whose claims to 
“restitution” would presumably eventually be addressed through the land reform 
program.  Accompanied by waving banners bearing the slogan “you promised us 
land and you gave us jail”, a representative of the people who had illegally moved 
onto their former land at Groot Vlakfontein in the Northern Cape addressed the 
crowd: 
 
We lodged a claim, procedurally.  We waited three years for the government, they said “we are 
validating, we are validating”.  Then we took action.  People should go to their land and occupy it … 
not “invade”.  We cannot “invade” the land that is rightfully ours.  
 
The President, in a recent speech, had attempted to discredit such occupations by 
stressing how different they were – in personnel and intention - to earlier waves of 
anti-apartheid resistance within South Africa.  In response, speakers emphasised the 
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trans-national theme of the workshop, validating their struggle by highlighting the 
continuity between such occupations and similar ones elsewhere in the world: 
 
President Mbeki says that the people who are protesting, and invading land, are not those who 
suffered in the struggle. But we are in the struggle now, and the struggle is not yet over.  The struggle 
continues.  Our struggle for land is the struggle that is happening in other parts of the globe.4
 
But despite the readiness of workshop participants to appropriate the recent peri-
urban “land invasions”, such as the Bredell one, as a means to strengthen the 
muscularity of the “landless” and of their response to state ineffectiveness or 
hostility, it was clear that this occasion was serving to voice the opinions of people 
claiming land more in a rural than in a peri-urban setting.  It was, then, those whose 
membership of the “landless” category would appear most self-evident who were 
making their voices heard here.  
 What the various “landless” had in common - what had brought them 
together in this workshop and what, if anything, would ensure the unity of their 
social movement - was that all had been assured that they belonged together within 
the government’s programme of land reform, and that all were experiencing 
frustration at the state’s inability, or unwillingness, to act.  
 In the sense that they had been united by this “single interest” rather than by 
some commonality of class background or of broader social circumstances, they 
conformed exactly to the definition of a social movement, in which one uniting 
feature overrides other differences. But if people as diverse as headmasters and farm 
labourers were joining together on the basis of a motif at once as emotional and as 
undefined as land (and state inaction over land), the means to overcome their 
dissatisfaction would certainly have to be as varied as its diverse causes.  
 To understand the full social and economic range of those gathered together 
at the workshop – those whose landlessness the land reform program was designed to 
address - it is necessary to briefly examine the  origins and intentions of this 
program, the way in which its “beneficiaries” were first conceptualised, and how it 
has shifted since its inception.  
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Unity in diversity: the land reform programme 
  From the outset, land reform had a high profile in the plans of those in South 
Africa’s liberation movement who were gearing up to take their places in the new 
government.  This was, in part, because of the way it combined the aim of restoring 
citizenship with that of ensuring economic progress for the poor.  Land reform, in 
attempting to offset the redress of specific past injustices against the fulfilling of 
demands for broader socio-economic redistribution, was to constitute a central part 
of the planning which underlay South Africa’s transition from an apartheid to a 
constitutional state.  
  If it was seen as crucial in restoring citizenship, this is because of its earlier 
centrality in the denial of citizenship. In the planning of apartheid’s ideologues, a 
system of customary tenure, closely allied to indirect rule, was intended to make 
communally-held property, in separate ethnically-defined territories, the basis of 
political dependency upon chiefs for the African population (Mamdani 1996:21-2). It 
was this system which laid the foundation for the definition of rural Africans as 
chiefly “subjects” rather than as citizens able to engage with civil society. As 
endorsed within the grand plans of apartheid, formulated and refined during the 
1950s, this system of tenure “mapped the social landscape” according to a particular 
conception of the innate relationship of “people to place” (Ashforth 1994:158). A 
favouring of communal tenure over privately-owned property thus lay at the heart of 
apartheid’s “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani 1996:15).  
  If apartheid was a system which denied citizenship, or assigned it on a 
second-class basis through a planned relationship of “people to place”, then its 
undoing required the uncoupling of this relationship, and the healing of the sharp 
divisions which it implied. In planners’ constitutionalist vision for the new South 
Africa (Wilson 2000), citizenship has been explicitly linked to the project of 
overcoming the past (Enslin 2000). The drafters of the new constitution saw land as 
central in defining the rights that had formerly been denied, and its restoration as a 
means to restore those rights and with them the sovereignty and full citizenship of 
the African population (du Toit 2000, Ramutsindela 1998). The intention to restore 
land to its former occupiers thus amounted to a reinstatement of basic civil liberties 
which had been removed, or denied, in the past: but it was also seen as assuring the 
rights of such people – and especially the most poor and vulnerable – to secure 
residence in the future.  
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  The importance of this line of thought, due in part to the prevalence of human 
rights lawyers amongst those developing it, was such that it initially enshrined a 
language of “rights”, especially “land rights”, rather than one about 
“property/ownership” at the heart of debates about reform. But a second, and 
increasingly important, line of argument has foregrounded the economic benefits to 
be gained from secure ownership of property. The two approaches were linked in the 
early years of the land reform program, which drew many former NGO officials into 
state employment. But the government’s subsequent shift towards more explicitly 
neo-liberal economic policies has seen the rights-based approach decoupled from the 
property-based/economic one, with a tendency to favour the latter. Attempts to foster 
a land-owning, middle-class African farming constituency are now paramount, 
eclipsing the previous emphasis on safeguarding the basic residence rights and 
welfare of the “rural poor” – “the landless” - through land redistribution or tenure 
reform (Cousins 2000, Williams 2000).  With this altered direction and the 
substitution of personnel which accompanied it, a number of former NGO activists 
and human rights lawyers, having briefly worked in state employment, have once 
again rejoined the NGO sector.  Here they are using legal means to challenge the 
government, in order to enforce the more egalitarian vision of the land reform 
program’s priorities.  Ironically, having first designed the programme, they are now 
amongst its sharpest critics.  
  One can see, in this brief overview, how a plan originally conceptualised as 
dealing with a diversity of priorities within a single overarching strategy has 
proceeded to unravel into separate strands, and how state and civil society have 
become increasingly divided over which of these strands should be prioritized.  
Underpinning this originally coherent master-plan, but responsible in part for its 
increasingly contested nature, is the extraordinary complexity of social categories, 
together comprising the “rural landless”, whose experienced injustices it was 
intended to redress and whose land needs – and, ultimately, welfare - it was designed 
to satisfy.   
  The plan, although presented in cohesive terms, did include some 
acknowledgement of this complex diversity by subdividing its intended activities 
into three categories. It was in the process of this subdivision, into restitution, 
redistribution and tenure reform, that matters of property and the actual means for its 
transfer received more detailed attention. The first, restitution, would concentrate on 
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returning land to those who had lost it during the apartheid era (though, 
controversially, the Restitution Act was phrased so as to render more far-reaching 
claims, situated further back in the past, illegitimate).  The second, redistribution, 
would allow for those Africans who had never had secure claims on landed property 
to group together and purchase farms with the aid of a government grant.  It was this 
strand, intended to benefit such people as “the landless poor, labour tenants, farm 
workers and emerging farmers” by “improving their livelihoods and quality of life” 
(DLA 1997:36), which increasingly came to appear the only way of transferring 
really significant amounts of formerly white-owned land to the “historically 
oppressed” (Lahiff 2001). The third strand, tenure reform, was intended to protect 
“the rights of residents of privately-owned farms and state land”, and to “reform the 
system of communal tenure prevailing in the former homelands” (ibid., see also 
Makopi 2001:144): that is, it would safeguard the rights of those who were unable to 
become owners of securely-owned land, by ensuring that they could not be 
summarily evicted from their existing places of residence on farms on in the former 
homelands.  The subdivision into these separate strands, although based on the 
divergent historical and social origins of the “landlessness” of each category of 
intended beneficiaries, contained an implicit analysis of the legal means by which 
property would be transferred and of the eventual status, in property terms, of those 
who would eventually be “landed”.  
  Inevitably, as with many other policy-makers’ categories inappropriately 
imposed on a local populace, the separate kinds of land claimants for whom these 
three subdivisions were originally designed have often been intertwined in practice 
(Murray 1996; Lahiff 2000). Restitution, aimed at former property owners who 
mostly lived outside the reserves, has been deployed as much to reinstate apartheid’s 
reserve-dwelling victims, while redistribution has served as a means to claim 
restitution by those whose dispossession occurred before the official 1913 “cut-off 
date”.5
  There is a further intertwining of social categories which this subdivision 
obscures.  A programme of land reform based on a subdivision between “urban” and 
“rural” people, and designed to benefit the latter, tends to obscure the intricate 
interconnections between rural and urban forms of identity which have resulted from 
South Africa’s exceptionally rapid transition to capitalist industry and agriculture 
(Bernstein 1996:41).  Many Africans “partly” domiciled in the rural areas have also 
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had experiences as members of the unionized workforce, supporters of urban-based 
political parties, Christian town-dwellers, and occupiers or even owners of urban 
property. Whatever tenure rights they possess or property claims they make within 
their country domiciles must be – but have not been, by the land reform programme - 
assessed in relation to town-based shifts in property relations and residential 
arrangements which affect them as urban wage-earners (James 1999).  
  Policy subdivisions such as these – admittedly made in the interests of 
efficiency in order to facilitate a division of labour within the state – thus tend to 
disregard long-term social, economic and historical processes.  They ignore, for 
example, how more than a century of rapid social transformation, together with the 
legislation designed to control it, has produced an extraordinary proliferation of 
different, but intricately interrelated types of landholding. Since well before 1913, 
Africans have been moving from tenancies on white farms to freehold black-owned 
land, from freehold to reserve, and sometimes back to white farms again, while 
“tribes” under chiefs have occupied land outside of the communal or homeland areas 
at the same time as individuals freed of chiefly fealty have been purchasing freehold 
within them (Beinart 1994:19; Francis and Williams 1993; La Hausse 2000; Murray 
1992).  
  The point made here can be more simply summarised.  The general 
ideological thrust of the land reform programme has encompassed a broad vision of 
restored rights, sovereignty and citizenship for the African population, informed by 
the prevalence of human rights lawyers in drafting the constitution and in setting up 
the programme itself.  At the same time, its detail embodies a series of subdivisions: 
most fundamentally between urban and rural, but extending also to separate those 
with more visible and obvious (former) rural land rights from those rural dwellers 
with few apparent rights of any kind.  These subdivisions attempt to separate what is 
in fact inseparable.  
 This point amounts to a general critique of policy-makers’ plans: one which 
could apply equally well in many contexts.  In the interests of effective social action, 
the confusing flux of social life must be categorized: but doing so necessarily limits 
the flux and distorts the true – and perhaps ultimately uncategorisable – nature of 
social reality. But what is of interest for the present paper is to examine how a 
particular grouping, within the confusing ranks of “the landless” outlined above, has 
come to occupy centre stage in the fierce debates between state and the NGO sector, 
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and has, as an idea if not as an actual social group, become a central protagonist of 
the social movement discussed earlier.   
 
State, NGOs and the “land question” 
  Understanding this process is inseparable from an examination of the fiercely 
contested social space encompassing – but also dividing - state and NGOs in South 
Africa.6  As the division has widened between those (now in state employ) who have 
increasingly prioritized the nurturing of a landed African class and those (now 
outside of it) who with increasing vociferousness champion the rights of “the 
landless”, so these groups of actors, for a short while almost indistinguishable in the 
heady and utopian period just after the 1994 election, have discovered ever more 
divisive ideological justifications for their divergent positions.  At the same time, 
however, these separate groups frequently find themselves having to work together 
in a series of uneasy coalitions.  
  NGOs have played an important role in South African society: one which has 
always tended to combine loftier concerns such as the challenging of injustice and 
the defence of rights with the more apparently humdrum provision of practical 
assistance. During the last two decades of the apartheid regime, a series of 
organisations, mostly funded by foreign donors, came into being.  Alongside their 
ideological opposition to state injustice, many ensured the provision of a series of 
services which ought by rights to have been done by the state. Among the most 
active of these were a series of “land NGOs”, originating in the need of communities 
threatened with resettlement to defend themselves from state action.  And in great 
demand by those in the “land NGOs” seeking to counter such actions by the state 
was the expertise of those in one “legal NGO” in particular - the Legal Resources 
Centre (LRC).  
  When, after 1994, the newly-oriented Department of Land Affairs was 
charged with implementing the land reform programme, it needed a range of new 
staff, and many of those it took into its ranks had gained their initial experience in 
matters of land through their work in the land and legal NGOs.  It was the high 
profile of these people within the programme that gave it its initially strongly “rights-
oriented” character.  This, in turn, is seen as having been a reaction to, but also a 
result of, the fact that apartheid South Africa had in turn been “quite self-consciously 
a legal order” in which ‘nothing was done without legal authorisation, from removals 
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to detentions … It was a way of ensuring that government functioned as a single line 
of authority’ (Martin Chanock, quoted in Palmer 2001).  This suggests that, despite 
the novelty of the brief which this department had now undertaken, there were some 
strong continuities with earlier practice: a preoccupation with law by the 
dispossessers was being matched by a similar preoccupation in the hands of those 
now championing the dispossessed.   
  Some light was thrown on these continuities when I interviewed Geoff 
Budlender, a key figure in the transitional moment which brought NGO personnel 
into the government.  Having directed the LRC until 1994, he now became Director-
General of Land Affairs under Minister Derek Hanekom.  Questioned later about the 
inordinately legalistic nature of the new Department’s activities after 1994, he 
defended the rights orientation:  
 
We said from the beginning we’d take a rights-based approach, because several influential 
people in the process were coming at it from a rights angle.  We wanted to create rights 
wherever possible.  This was a good decision: one needs something secure that people can 
hold onto.  At times I thought we were overdoing it, and I tended to be softer on the 
legislative side.  But I was wrong – people need rights to be able to hold government to.  
Rights set standards and provide an overall framework.7
 
Although admitting that there had been criticisms of the excessively complex new 
laws, with their endless sub-clauses inserted “to cope with various eventualities”, he 
pointed out that the real test – and vindication - of the “legal” approach came when, 
after the 1999 elections, he and most of his colleagues were replaced by a new 
battery of officials hand-picked by the new Minister: 
 
It’s true that we over-legislated, but … people do need firm rights.  For example, under  the 
Tenure Security Act, there was a provision which said “The Minister may make part of the 
farm available for worker ownership”.  There was a dispute over whether the “may” ought to 
have been “shall”.  The legal adviser said we ought to make it “may”, then there was a big 
fight about it.  The “shall” won.  And now the new Minister has closed down the programme.  
We were right to stick with “shall” – the “shall” will make a big difference now that the 
policy has shifted.  One needs a hook, a definite point of reference, and the law can provide 
this.8   
  
 As Budlender and many of his colleagues moved back into the NGO sector 
after their brief five years in office, they thus found themselves in a strange position. 
Pre-1994, the LRC had used its legal muscle to challenge the apartheid state on its 
intent to shift the African population around the countryside. Now, post-1999, it 
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would be using that muscle to hold the post-apartheid state to the laws its activists 
had passed whilst briefly occupying state positions and holding state portfolios.  Of 
these laws, those now seen as most significant were the ones intended to secure 
especially the most vulnerable parts of the African population within those country 
areas to which they had been scattered.  It was at this point, post-1999, that activists 
started directing their energies, in particular, to safeguarding the informal rights of 
“the landless”: rights which had never been recognized and which would be difficult 
to enforce.  
 Continuities with the former regime existed on levels as well.  Some of these 
were sufficiently strong, during the 1994-99 period, to inhibit the achieving of the 
new programme’s goals.  At levels below that of the senior office-holders, the 
Department was still staffed and run by a battery of administrators inherited from the 
apartheid regime.  It was these administrators, according to one-time restitution 
officer in the Department, Tony Harding, who were unwilling to bend to the 
authority – or share the egalitarian vision - of their new masters:  
 
Land reform was different from what they were used to doing. … They had inherited 
attitudes to these communities and could not conceptualise a different framework, or think 
that people might behave differently.  They believed that our policy was one which was 
designed to facilitate “squatting”, as they called it.  They were only interested in dealing with 
people who owned the land.  They had a bias towards title and private property, so they 
easily understood claims in which people had actually owned property beforehand, but not 
the ones … involving former labour tenants and rental tenants who had been removed from 
the land.9  
   
Harding considers the reluctance of these officials to help in securing the rights of 
those whom they saw as “squatters” (corresponding with the narrower definition of 
“the landless” in this paper), to have been an important factor in the much-decried 
“failure” of the programme to deliver on its initial promises during the first five years 
of its existence.  (Other factors cited have been the Department’s minscule budget – 
though critics point out that this was underspent in any case – and the fact that its 
first minister post-1994 was a relatively junior person enjoying far less influence 
within the ANC than his more experienced counterparts who had come back from 
exile.) 
  The disdain of these apartheid-era administrators for “squatters” and non-
landowners points towards a further continuity of ideology which was to become 
consolidated after the new Minister, Thoko Didiza, took office. Here, several 
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commentators have remarked on a key irony. It was the previous, white, minister, 
Derek Hanekom who was happier travelling to the countryside to visit landless 
communities than sitting in his office.  In contrast, his African successor, Thoko 
Didiza, sympathising less with “the landless” than with those, like her own family, 
who had owned land, felt more at home among the African middle class or in the 
company of chiefs, and rarely spent any time visiting rural communities.  Referring 
to the change in leadership and in personnel, some analyzed the post-1999 change in 
the Department as one in which a “race” conflict had taken place.  But other 
commentators preferred, instead of looking at the shift in departmental personnel, to 
refer to the changing constituency which the Department in its earlier and later 
incarnations had seen itself as serving: thus analyzing it as a conflict of “class”.10  
Whichever of these is most accurate, many people pointed to the parallel between the 
disregard for the rights and wellbeing of “squatters”, manifest among older Afrikaner 
officials, and a similar indifference to their plight by those working under the new 
minister. (They included these apartheid officials, who had simply “stayed on” 
through all these changes)11.  
A further continuity between old and new was to be found in a preoccupation 
with spatial planning. If South African blacks have been victims of a “quite 
extraordinary degree of planning” in the 20th century (Crush and Jeeves 1993), then 
an equal preoccupation with the spatial locating of the populace can be discerned in 
many post-1994 policy debates concerned with undoing apartheid’s spatial plans via 
the land reform programme (Makopi 2000:145-6). The resources deployed now, in 
character although certainly not in scale, match those deployed earlier, especially if 
one looks at the level of involvement of professional planners.  Ironically, many of 
those now serving the state as planning consultants are the very same people who 
worked for the apartheid government!12 Although the propensity of the South 
African state to construct and carry out elaborate plans for the geographical placing 
of people is thus usually seen as motivated primarily by its racist ideology, such 
inclinations have been present post-apartheid as well.  Indeed, they appear to be 
shared by states everywhere (Scott 1998), and have been embraced as well, in this 
case, by those in the NGO movement.  
 But a simple observation, and listing, of continuities between the staffing and 
ideology of the state in pre- and post-apartheid South Africa is not sufficient to 
demonstrate the key point I want to make here.  While there is a growing division 
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between the advocates of the landed (many of whom are in the state) and those of 
“the landless” (increasingly seen as the preserve of the NGO sector), this division is 
also and simultaneously an interrelation, particularly at the provincial level.  On the 
one hand, the land NGOs see their role as one of challenging the state, moving it 
beyond what has come to be seen as its narrow, even Thatcherite focus on the 
entrenching (or restoring) of property rights.   On the other, however much these 
activists may want to commit themselves primarily to championing the informal 
rights of the poor, they are compelled by the insistent demands of their many 
constituents, and by financial considerations, to work in parallel, or even hand-in-
hand, with the Department of Land Affairs.  In a few cases, this type of close 
collaboration has been facilitated by strong personal networks which continue to 
exist between provincial-level state and the NGO sector (and the more radical-
leaning NGOs are critical of their brethren for being thus compromised). Indeed, in 
another interesting parallel with the apartheid era, NGOs often take on what should 
be the duties of the state.  In the case of land claims, these involve guiding 
communities through each of the complex, and onerous, phases of the land-claiming 
process before the seal is finally set on each claim.13   
 
Landlessness revisited: the case of “tenure reform” 
 Despite some degree of co-operation on practical matters, the ideological and 
social rift over the question of “landlessness” remains, and appears to be growing 
wider.  The attention of the NGO sector has focused increasingly on those whose 
insecurity of tenure was intended to be – but never effectively was - addressed within 
the original programme: primarily through “redistribution” and “tenure reform”.  Put 
differently, these are the “squatters” about whose rights the DLA administrators, and 
the new Minister, appear to have been so indifferent.  Of these two, it is a particular 
initiative within the rubric of “tenure reform” to which I will give some attention in 
the next few pages: but the other aspects also require some brief discussion.   
Redistribution soon became one of the primary sources of contention within 
the programme, primarily because of its having been combined with a type of 
government grant which could be accessed by each family (Settlement Land 
Acquisition Grant – SLAG) and, controversially, with a “willing buyer/willing seller 
model” originally proposed by the World Bank.  This arrangement required the 
pooling of resources in order to make any effective land purchase, and led, in many 
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cases, to the recruiting by elites of new settlers purely on the basis that their grants, 
once combined, would allow for the acquisition of a suitably-sized farm. Such 
strategically-mobilised groups, which have been derogatorily described as “rent-a-
crowds”, often found it was unsustainable to live on the land to whose purchase they 
had contributed: it would then revert by default to the original initiator. Whether or 
not because of this controversy, the new Minister soon placed a moratorium on all 
new redistribution projects.  But even where redistribution appeared to be working 
with relative success, and indeed to be supported by white farmers living in the 
vicinity of those Africans newly purchasing land, those in the NGO sector 
complained that it was not fulfilling its promise.  The African farmers to whom 
whites were giving support were those who “looked just like them”: that is the 
program was privileging those who were potentially or actually middle class – and 
who would under any circumstances been well-placed to become the owners of 
landed property - rather than helping the “poorest of the poor”.14   
Such failures meant, in effect, that an even greater weight would be borne by 
the last remaining initiative: that of “tenure reform”. A great deal of intellectual 
energy and research has gone into the development of appropriate legal measures to 
safeguard the rights of those without secure tenure. The extent of this energy is 
considered justified, overall, by reference to the initiative’s importance in securing 
basic livelihoods for the rural “poor”: in practice, however, the fact that these “poor” 
are to be found in two separate geographical and social contexts has meant a 
bifurcation of the initiative.  One of these contexts is the former homelands, held 
under a system of communal tenure; the other is white-owned farms.  
The relative importance of these two contexts as focuses for the attention of “land 
reformers” has been a matter of some debate. The activists connected to the state 
programme, feeling strongly about the need to protect landholders in the former 
homelands from the arbitrary and tyrannical actions of chiefs, designed legislation 
intended to retain the flexibility of communal tenure as a “safety net for the poor” 
while somehow curbing the vagaries of chiefly power (Adams et al 2000; Claassens 
2000).15   But their efforts were stymied when, at the same time as shifting them out 
of state employ, the new Minister shelved their new Land Rights Bill.  There are 
those in the NGO sector, however, who claim that the efforts of those bent on tenure 
reform in the former “homelands” were in any case misdirected.  Their line of 
argument goes that few people in the former homelands effectively suffer insecurity 
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of tenure; that given earlier precedents it would be worse to interfere with the 
existing system than to respect, and maintain, the delicate balance which presently 
exists; and that it would be illogical to help people consolidate the little piece of land 
they already have when it is more urgent to ensure a wider, more general 
redistribution of land.  Perhaps the most telling indication of this, they claim, is that 
their constituents – those asking them for most advice and help – include very few 
homeland-dwellers but large numbers of farm labourers or farm labour tenants in 
need of help, as well as some of the “land invaders” mentioned earlier.16  The proper 
place for “tenure reform”, according to this argument, is where it is most needed: by 
those “landless” living on the farms and/or by those attempting to find some security 
on the fringes of cities.   
It is through this process of ideological contestation, in which a vociferous 
sector within the land NGOs have adopted the more apparently “radical” position 
(so-called because of its propensity to support “land invasions” by both categories of 
people - though they have effectively been carried out more by the latter), that this 
subcategory of the landless came to carry such rhetorical weight at the landlessness 
workshop discussed earlier.  
 
Reforming tenure on the farms 
 Those living and working on South Africa’s white farms have long been 
considered the poorest, most underprivileged, and most disenfranchised section of 
the country’s populace.  Initially unable to partake in, and later unable to benefit 
from, the kinds of urban-based group action – amongst trade unionists, members of 
youth organization, and the like – which are reputed to have played so large a role in 
the country’s democratization, farm workers have remained spatially divided and 
invisible, and hence under-resourced in economic, social and educational terms.  
Their plight is seen as deriving, in the main, from the extreme dependence of each 
farm worker on his own particular farmer/employer for both employment and for a 
place to live (Hall et al 2001).   
Yet attempts to remedy this situation through the land reform programme do 
not seem to have helped.  On the contrary: it is one of the great ironies of this 
programme that the legislation put in place by its protagonists to secure the land 
rights of farm workers – primarily the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), 
passed on 28 November 1997 – has actually had the effect of worsening their 
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plight.17  The act has attempted strictly to legislate the terms under which eviction 
from a farm can take place, but it has had the unintended consequence of informing 
farmers accurately about the steps they need to take in order to effect a “legal 
eviction”. The legislation is thought to have posed a threat to farm owners, and to 
have caused many who had been living for years in relative harmony with their 
workers suddenly to start mistreating or evicting them. The rate of evictions, and of 
atrocities such as beatings and other forms of maltreatment, spiralled steeply shortly 
before the act was passed and has continued to be high in the years since its 
passing.18  
 In recognition of this fact, much of the work of the legal and land NGOs in 
respect of farm labour has focused on attempting to protect such workers from 
eviction.  The nature of the aid has been extensive: including ambitious schemes 
such as the nationwide “Farmworkers Project” which combined the expertise of the 
land and legal sector in monitoring, advising on, and representing workers in cases of 
eviction.19  On a more modest and local scale, the only one of the provincial land 
NGOs which does, in its own right, offer advice and legal representation to 
farmworkers is Nkuzi, through its offices in the Northern Province (now renamed 
Limpopo) and Gauteng.  The main body of its work involves liasing between farmers 
and the workers they have evicted or threatened with eviction.  But its successes are 
few, mostly because conflicts have often progressed too far by the time Nkuzi has 
been informed.  In those cases where they have been successful it was not intractable 
disputes between owner and worker, but rather minor errors or misunderstandings - 
relating perhaps to the death of the owner, the sale of the farm, or the advanced age 
of the farm worker - which led to the threatened eviction. In the case of Mr Beith of 
Vaalwater, for example, his dissatisfaction with and threatened eviction of an elderly 
employee were reversed once the Nkuzi field-worker intervened and provided 
translation and mediation. After meetings and discussions, Mr Beith agreed to 
provide 1 hectare plots to each of his workers so that they would have security even 
in the event of his death.20  (more examples to be provided). But such cases of 
enlightened paternalism are few and far between.  
The inevitable logic whereby an over-legislative apartheid state produced 
over-legislative reactions has been outlined above, as has the faith in such legislation 
expressed by such lawyer-activists as Geoff Budlender, who rejoiced that his brief 
period in government allowed him to enact laws whose application he would later be 
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in a position to enforce.  This has, however, proved almost impossible in the 
particular circumstances in which farm labourers live.  In essence, it has been 
precisely farm labourers’ vulnerability, poverty and lack of rights which has made 
them unable to seek the protection of the law intended to reduce their vulnerability 
and poverty and to ensure their rights.  Ironically, many of them have, on the 
contrary, been evicted from their former homes by means of that law. The DLA has 
been described as unresponsive to the pressure brought to bear upon it by its NGO 
watchdogs, and farm workers are said to be frustrated with how little the legal 
process can deliver.21 The broad-based and principled safeguarding of “rights” which 
informed the land reform programme from the outset, and its greater ambition of 
ensuring the (re)establishment of citizenship, have thus been least effective on the 
farms.  
At issue in the debates which rage about the need to reform or at least secure 
tenure for such people – for those who at best have been classified as farm tenants 
but who at worst feature as the “squatters” derided by Land Affairs Administrators – 
are questions which go to the heart of the rights of citizens and their entitlement to 
social welfare.  These questions, although always refracted through the idiom of 
“land”, concern the provision of resources far beyond it. At their most lofty, they are 
questions about equity and social justice: while at their more practical level they 
concern whether the care of the poor, and of the populace in general, should be the 
responsibility of the state, or whether paternalistic social structures can or should be 
relied upon to achieve such ends as they have done in the past.   
The debate tends to proceed along the lines of a tug-of-war.  For every 
instance of failure to devolve welfare and other functions to the realm of the private, 
there will be a proposal from those in the NGO sector that the state assume even 
greater and more far-reaching responsibility for, in part by exercising more far-
reaching powers in respect of, the welfare of the poor.  So, for example, the failure to 
ensure that people acquire secure rights on the farm of their employer was met by a 
challenge to the state to intervene in order to initiate a “meaningful transfer of land 
ownership to those who need it” (Euijen nd:68; Lahiff nd).  Although it is beyond the 
reach of this paper to explore why “land”, and the “right to land” have been placed at 
the centre of debates about welfare provision, it is intriguing to ask why “land” has 
come to acquire such discursive force.  
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Such contestations over welfare do not only pit the state against its NGO 
watchdogs.  They can be seen in operation even within a single organization such as 
Nkuzi. Being constrained by practical and immediate considerations and by the need 
to serve its immediate constituency as discussed above, Nkuzi’s efforts have tended 
at the local level to focus on brokering and negotiating deals with individual (and 
usually more enlightened) farmers like the Mr Beiths of this world. This amounts to 
an acknowledgment that welfare provision for the old and the unemployed can only 
be secured through the goodwill of those few private (white) property owners willing 
to bear this burden.  Again, there is a superb irony in evidence here.  Paternalism lay 
at the heart of farmer/labourer relationships during apartheid (Van Onselen 1996): it 
was intended that the end of this regime would bring equity and hence an escape 
from such relationships.  But to gain freedom from paternalism, under present 
circumstances, is to become truly “landless” and hence without any basis for 
citizenship.  
At the same time, there are those within the organisation and within the 
broader NGO coalition who insist on the need to sustain an unrelenting pressure on 
the state.  Such pressure is exercised at the higher, less regionally-bounded levels of 
organisations, as in the recent case where Nkuzi, with the help of the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC), took the Minister of Land Affairs Thoko Didiza to court.  
The action concerned the government’s failure to provide adequate legal aid in rural 
areas, thus rendering African farm-dwellers effectively helpless to operationalise 
their rights under ESTA (the 1997 Extension of Security of Tenure Act) and hence to 
escape eviction.  Nkuzi won the case in the Land Claims Court during 2001, but the 
practical and financial implications of this victory are still being worked out.   
 
Bredell land invasions and the urban/rural divide 
(still to be written) 
 
(Interim) Conclusion 
 If, as discussed above, it is farm workers who are the most vulnerable 
country-dwellers and hence those most urgently in need of land (or at least tenure) 
reform, then why were there not more of them at the Workshop whose proceedings 
opened this paper?  Why was it, rather, the Bredell-style land invasions which 
formed the rhetorical focus of proceedings (even though none of the invaders was 
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present to enunciate his point of view), while the majority of  the “actual landless”  
who spoke were drawn from the ranks of those who, in principle if not in practice, 
were designed to have their land rights restored through the “restitution” arm of the 
land reform program?   
 The answers are complex.  Among the “landless” at this workshop, former 
landowners, who were the most vociferous, have always been the “obvious” targets 
of land reform.  Relative to other landholders, their property rights have been clearer-
cut and somewhat easier to assert and retrieve.  Indeed, it was their efforts to reclaim 
land which were in large part responsible to the initial growth of the “land NGOs” 
and hence, indirectly, the “legal NGOs” as well (James 2000, Palmer 2001).  Farm 
workers, as stated above, are geographically and socially isolated: even NGO efforts 
to overcome this and to encourage their membership of a social movement have had 
limited success.  The invaders of peri-urban land, such as those who briefly took up 
residence at Bredell, have been at the forefront of media attention and have attracted 
most notice from the DLA as well, in part because their actions bear a disturbing 
similarity to the Zimbabwe case. They seem to threaten illegality and unconcern for 
the rule of law.  Most disturbing to those in the state, and being fostered by some 
elements within the NGOs, is the real or perceived “copycat” effect.  Will 
“Zimbabwe-style” land invasions, now brought closer to home as “Bredell-style” 
land invasions, spread to others within the fledgling social movement and inspire the 
“landless”, however divergent their actual social origins and the potential uses to 
which they might put the land, to take the law into their own hands in order to secure 
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